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24 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT: Reinvestigation Program

1. This is for the information of the Deputy Director (Support) and is in response to the memorandum of 15 October 1963.

2. We feel we do have a system which provides for a review of security records on our employees at least every five years. While we do have the system, we must admit that we did suspend, in the Spring of 1963, the actual placing of additional employee cases under investigation. This step was considered to be necessary because of the high case load from the Office of Personnel. Now that the greatest impact of this case load has been felt, we have resumed the initiating of field investigations of employees.

3. Your point is well taken that some employee files might be reviewed twice or more on matters initiated by other mechanisms, while some might not be reviewed at all. This was one of the possibilities for which we attempted to allow when our systems were worked out. Our systems were designed with two objectives, if indeed they can be separated, i.e.:

- a. we wanted a record which would permit us to determine, by date of entrance on duty, which persons should be reinvestigated first; and
- b. we wanted a record which would permit us to identify the employee whose record would not otherwise come up for security review.

4. We have done this through the use of a deck of IDI cards arranged by date of entrance on duty. The cards in this deck are not rearranged or moved for any purpose except to record a review or determination made under the reinvestigation program. Other security actions are not reflected in and do not affect this particular operation. The case figure mentioned in our prior memoranda are statistics obtained from the reinvestigation program only.

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5. If we reviewed the file on every employee of the Agency for the sole purpose of determining whether or not they had been reinvestigated or their file reviewed for other purposes, the statistical count would be much higher. We have not done this, however, in order to keep better controls and more meaningful statistics on the reinvestigation program.

6. We have operated in this way:



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7. Our earlier discussions with Personnel on average tenure of employees led us to believe that of the total number of Agency employees we would have around [redacted] at any one time who would have five or more years with the Agency. We set a target for ourselves of [redacted] cases a month which would permit us to cover [redacted] employees a year or [redacted] in five years. If our attrition rate maintains, we feel that we will be able to do the job every five years. As we get near the end of the first run through, we should be able to boost or cut back our production figure.

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8. We believe we have the system required and with no major change in our T/O and with no major upward changes in our other case loads, we feel that the system will do what we both want it to do.

SIGNED

R. L. Bannerman  
Director of Security

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